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Abstract. Several new architectures have been recently proposed to replace the 
Internet Protocol Suite with a data-centric or publish/subscribe (pub/sub) net-
work layer waist for the Internet. The clean-slate design makes it possible to 
take into account issues in the current Internet, such as unwanted traffic, from 
the start. If these new proposals are ever deployed as part of the public Internet 
as an essential building block of the infrastructure, they must be able to operate 
in a hostile environment, where a large number of users are assumed to collude 
against the network and other users. In this paper we present a security design 
through the network stack for a data-centric pub/sub architecture that achieves 
availability, information integrity, and allows application-specific security poli-
cies while remaining scalable. We analyse the solution and examine the mini-
mal trust assumptions between the stakeholders in the system to guarantee the 
security properties advertised. 
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1 Introduction 
Data-centric pub/sub as a communication abstraction [2,3,4] reverses the control 
between the sender and the receiver. Publication in the middle decouples the publisher 
from the subscriber and there is no direct way of sending a message to a given net-
work, which provides a good starting point against distributed denial of service 
(DDoS) attacks, where a number of nodes try to flood part of the network with un-
wanted traffic. 
Most pub/sub systems have been overlays on top of IP but our goal is to replace the 
whole Internet protocol suite with a clean-slate data-centric pub/sub network waist 
[14]. This enables new ways to secure the architecture in a much more fundamental 
way compared to overlay solutions, as the underlay cannot anymore be used to launch 
DDoS attacks against arbitrary nodes in the network. Our architecture comprises of 
rendezvous, topology, and forwarding functions and the security design presented 
here covers all these as a whole. In this paper we refine and extend our work in [5] 
and especially concentrate on the concept of scope and how it can be used flexibly to 
168 K. Visala, D. Lagutin, and S. Tarkoma 
support many types of application-specific security policies. Some of the techniques 
used in our architecture, such as securing of forwarding, delivery tree formation, and 
rendezvous system interconnection are explained in [5] in more detail. 
Our security goals concur with [1] except that confidentiality and privacy are ex-
pected to be handled on top of the network layer and are outside the scope of this 
paper. The security goals are: 
• Availability, which means that the attackers cannot prevent communication be-
tween a legitimate publisher and a subscriber inside a trusted scope. 
• Information integrity, which guarantees that the binding between the identity of 
the publication and its content cannot be broken without the subscriber noticing it. 
• Application-specific security policies, which mean that the architecture can cater 
for the specialized security policies of different types of applications while par-
tially same resources can be shared by them. 
In addition to aforementioned goals, the solution is restricted by the requirements of 
scalability and efficiency. For example, it must be assumed that the core routers 
forward packets at line-speeds of tens of Gigabits per second, which requires ex-
pensive, high speed memory for the routing tables. In the inter-domain setting, we 
have to take into account the various stakeholders such as ISPs, end-users, and 
governments, and tussles [6] between their goals. That is, we cannot enforce certain 
design choices but keep the architecture flexible and let the balance of power be-
tween stakeholders to decide the stable configuration. The design should also ad-
here to architectural constraints such as the end-to-end principle (E2E) [13] by 
which we mean that the network itself should only have minimal functionality that 
is required to efficient utilization of the invested resources, and the rest of the fea-
tures should be implemented on higher layers at the endpoints to be more flexible. 
The architecture must be incrementally deployable, and minimal in complexity and 
trust assumptions between stakeholders. 
2 Basic Concepts 
Data- or content-centric networking can be seen as the inversion of control between 
the sender and the receiver compared to message passing: Instead of naming sinks to 
which senders can address messages, the receiver expresses its interest in some identi-
fied data that the network then returns when it becomes available taking advantage of 
multicast and caching [2,3]. We use the term information-centric for this communica-
tion pattern to emphasize that the data items can link to other named data and that the 
data has structure.  
An immutable association can be created between a rendezvous identifier (Rid) and 
a data value by a publisher and we call this association a publication. At some point 
in time, a data source may then publish the publication inside a set of scopes that 
determine the distribution policies such as access control, routing algorithm, reach-
ability, and QoS for the publication and may support transport abstraction specific 
policies such as replication and persistence for data-centric communication. The 
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scope must be trusted by the communicating nodes to function as promised and much 
of the security of our architecture is based on this assumption as we explain in [5]. 
Scopes are identified with a special type of Rid called scope identifier (Sid).  
Even though the control plane  of our architecture, implementing the rendezvous 
function, operates solely using data-centric pub/sub model, it can be used to set up 
communication using any kind of transport abstraction on the data plane fast path, 
that is used for the payload communication. The data-centric paradigm is a natural 
match with the communication of topology information that needs to be distributed 
typically to multiple parties and the ubiquitous caching considerably reduces the ini-
tial latency for the payload communication as popular operations can be completed 
locally based on cached data. 
Below the control plane, t he network is composed of domains, that encapsulate re-
sources such as links, storage space, processing power in routers, and information. The 
concept of domain is here very general, and can refer to abstractions of any granularity, 
such as software components, individual nodes, or ASes. An upgraph of a node is the 
set of potential resources, that can be represented as a network map of domains and their 
connectivity, to which a node has an independent access to based on its location and 
contracts between providers. We have developed our own language called advanced 
network description language (ANDL) for the communication of network topology 
information in control plane publications, but it is outside the scope of this paper. 
The links in the upgraphs represent resources with minimal abstraction and can be   
limited to carrying only various transport abstractions or protocols over them. Each 
transport protocol implements a specific communication abstraction and every actual-
ized instance of interaction or communication event consuming the resources of the 
network has an associated transport, topic, a graphlet and a set of roles. For example, 
when IP is seen as a transport protocol in our network architecture, the roles for the 
endpoints are a source and a destination or for data-centric transport: a data source 
and a subscriber. The topic is identified with an Rid and is used to match the end 
nodes in correct interaction instances by the scope. For example, for data-centric 
communication, the topic identifies the requested publication.  
A graphlet defines the network resources used for the  payload communication and 
it can be anything from the path of an IP packet to private virtual circuits. Some pro-
tocols may require an additional phase for the reservation of a graphlet before the 
payload communication. A graphlet adheres to a set of scopes that are responsible for 
policy-compliant matching of nodes to interaction instances, collecting the needed 
information to build end-to-end paths and placing constraints on the chosen resources 
for the graphlet. A graphlet connects a set of end nodes that each implement a certain 
role in the transport.  
C ommunication always happens inside at least a single scope, but the policies can 
be divided into aspects of communication handled modularly by different scopes 
implemented by different entities. Scopes are responsible for combining upgraph 
information from multiple nodes requesting to participate in an interaction instance 
inside the scope [15] and the scope selects a subset of the given resource that adhere 
to its policies. In cases such as CDNs, the scope can bring its own additional re-
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sources to be used in the graphlet. It should be noted, that because a scope can act as a 
neutral 3rd party for the route selection, it can balance the power between endpoints 
and optimize the path as a whole. 
2.1 Identifier Structure 
All identifiers in our system have the similar self-certifying, DONA-like structure  
[4]. An identifier is a (P,L) pair where P is the public-key of the namespace owner of 
the identifier and L is a variable length label of binary data. Only fixed length hash of 
the identifier is used in-network, for example in caches, to identify a publication, but 
variable length names are needed for dynamically generated content, where the data 
source uses the label as an argument to produce the publication on the fly. This could 
have been emulated by using only fixed length identifiers, but it would have required 
additional round-trips in some cases. Because each namespace is managed by its 
owner, we do not need a special hierarcy or centralized entity managing the labels. 
The self-certification is achieved by the namespace owner authorizing a publisher 
to publish a certain set of labels in the namespace. The actual content segments are 
then signed by the publisher and the certificate from the namespace owner is in-
cluded. Together these form a trust chain starting from the namespace owner that can 
be verified by the subscriber. Here the security model only guarantees the integrity of 
the association between an identifier and its content. It is assumed that the subscriber 
knows that she has the correct identifier and trusts the scope enough for availability.  
For the cases where the content of the publication is known beforehand and no hu-
man-readable labels are required, we support a stronger model by allowing the hash 
of the content to be stored in the label part of the Rid. Confidentiality of publications 
can be achieved by encryption of the content and/or the labels. 
Fig. 1 depicts a simplified example of “My movie edit meta-data” publication that 
has Rid (PN, “My Robin Hood video edit”), where PN is the public key of the user's 
own namespace. The contents of this publication point to another “movie frame data” 
publication indirectly using a so called application level identifier (Aid) of the re-
ferred publication. Alternatively, a network level Rid could have been used directly, 
but they are not assumed to have a long life-time as the security mechanism is cou-
pled with the identifier. We assume that multiple application level schemes for identi-
fiers with different properties will be developed and these can be translated into Rids 
by various means. DNS is one such orthogonal mechanism that could be used to map 
long-term human-readable names to Rid namespace public keys. 
As can be seen in  Fig. 1, the publication contents are split into segments, that each 
have their own signature chain starting from the PN verifying the contents of the seg-
ment. This makes it possible to check segments independently, for example, before 
caching. Because it is not feasible to use traditional cryptographic solutions like RSA 
on a per-segment basis in the payload communication, we use packet level authentica-
tion (PLA) [25] that uses elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [23]. An FPGA based 
hardware accelerator has been developed for PLA [24] accelerating cryptographic 
operations. 
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Fig. 1. Publications can refer to other publications persistently using long-term Aids. The 
scopes, where publications are made available are orthogonal to the structure of the data. 
In Fig. 1, the publication on the left is published inside “My home scope” that is fully 
controlled by the local user. On the other hand, the movie frame publication on the 
right is stored inside movies studio's localized scope, which can, for example, limit 
the access to the scope only to the customers of the company. In this example, it is 
easy to see that the logical structure of the data, e. g. the link between the two publica-
tions, is orthogonal to the scoping of the data that determines the communication 
aspects for each publication. 
2.2 Interdomain Structure 
Each node has an access to a set of network resources. In the current Internet, most 
policy compliant paths have the so-called valley-free property [16], which means that, 
on the AS business relationship level, packets first follow 0-n logical customer-provider 
“up-hill'' links, then 0-1 peer-peer links, and finally 0-n provider-customer „down-hill'' 
links. The relationships between ASes are typically based on simple bilateral contracts 
and we assume that this remains to be the case for the future. 
In NIRA  [17], it was discovered that almost all policy-compliant paths can be con-
structed by joining the upgraphs of the communicating endpoints. An upgraph con-
tains transitively all ASes reachable from the node following only customer-provider 
links and possibly a single peer-peer link as the last hop of the path. The upgraphs 
contain typically little less than 300 ASes without peering links and around 1500 
ASes when taking the peering links into account. The total number of ASes is about 
30000, which means that the “two-sided'' approach can reduce 50-fold the number of 
links to consider. NIRA cannot express all BGP policies as the upgraphs will always 
be the same independent of the packet destination, but our ANDL can be also used to 
model BGP.  
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3 Architecture 
A central component in our architecture is the rendezvous system, which implements 
a data-centric pub/sub primitive as a recursive, hierarchical structure, which first joins 
node local rendezvous implementations into rendezvous networks (RN) and then RNs 
into a global rendezvous interconnect (RI) using a hierarchical Chord DHT [18,19] as 
shown in Fig. 2. The RNs can be implemented, for example, using DONA [4] imple-
mentations. In another dimension, the rendezvous system is split into common ren-
dezvous core and scope-specific implementations of scope home nodes that imple-
ment the functionality for a set of scopes.  
 
Fig. 2. A client and a service rendezvous on the control plane at the scope home of the scope in 
which the communication takes place. The scope joins the upgraphs and produces an end-to-
end path between the service container (e.g. a data source) and the client (e.g. a subscriber) and 
returns the information to the client that can then use this information to join a graphlet (e.g. a 
delivery tree) that can then be used for the fast-path payload communication. 
At every level of the hierarchy, the rendezvous core provides an anycast routing to the 
approximately closest scope home that hosts a given scope. A subscription message 
contains the (Sid,Rid) tuple of the publication of which contents the client wishes to 
receive. Each node in the rendezvous core can cache results and immediately route 
the answer back along the reverse route to the client. The rendezvous message is first 
hierarchically routed towards a scope pointer based on the hash of the Sid and then 
the pointer redirects the request towards the approximately closest scope home. Also 
scope pointers can be cached. Publication messages are routed similarly and they 
contain also the contents of the publication in addition to the (Sid,Rid) pair. The scope 
then stores the contents of the publication so that it can serve the subscribers request-
ing it. In accordance with the fate-sharing principle [20], both the publication and 
subscription messages need to be periodically repeated in order to keep the publica-
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tion data or pending subscription alive. This pub/sub primitive is the only functional-
ity implemented by the rendezvous core. We refer to our work in [5] for a detailed 
description of the rendezvous security mechanisms. 
Scopes, however, can have varying implementations. When a cached result cannot 
be found in the rendezvous core, the subscription reaches the scope, which can then 
dynamically generate the response if it has enough information available. It is possi-
ble to avoid caching by including version information in the Rid. Each scope imple-
mentation may be scaled up by adding more scope home nodes and implementing 
their own coordination protocol internally. We note that the slow-path control plane 
rendezvous is not meant for transfer of large publications, but this type of applications 
should be supported by adding a data-centric transport to the data plane as  we did 
in [2].  
Topology manager (TM) is another function that is implemented by each inde-
pendently managed domain. Its task is to crawl and collect neighbourhood ANDL 
map and metadata publications of network components using the rendezvous. From 
this information TM builds a complete view of the local network and publishes this 
information back into the rendezvous for other nodes to listen to. TM may also hide 
parts of the network and setup higher-level links in the network map. TM also sub-
scribes to route advertisements from neighbouring domains and updates its upgraph 
publication accordingly. TM can also act as the local scope home and control its poli-
cies. Information about other networks can be found because the publications are 
named in a standard fashion based on the cryptographic identity of each domain and 
scope. Basically, a domain X is assumed to have a cryptographic identity DKX that 
can be carried in network description attributes. Each domain has a scope with Sid 
(DKX, “external scope”) and another scope called “local scope”, which is reachable 
only locally. Each scope also publishes a meta-data publication inside itself named 
(DKX,“scope meta-data”) describing which transports the scope supports, among 
others. It should be noted that the upgraph combination based routing does not require 
any type of central entity to manage addresses but the internetwork can freely evolve 
based on trust between neighbouring domains. 
4 Phases of Communication  
Each node  wishing to communicate first requests the description of end-to-end fast-
path resources used for the graphlet from the scope by subscribing to a publication 
labeled “<Topic_Rid>, <UN>, t” where UN is the (Sid,Rid) pair naming the ANDL 
upgraph map of the node and t is the current time. If the scope performing the up-
graph joining is access controlled, then the subscribed label also includes the node 
identity. The upgraph data itself is published by the provider domain of the node. 
Because many nodes share the same upgraph, the data-centric rendezvous system 
caches them orthogonally close to the scope homes that are nodes implementing the 
scope in question. Similarly, the result of the rendezvous is automatically cached and 
reused if another node in the same domain requests the same service. ANDL maps 
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can also link to other maps and a complete map can be built recursively from smaller 
publications, which minimizes the amount of communication as only relevant infor-
mation needs to be transfered. Multiple scopes can be used together by performing the 
rendezvous independently for each of the scopes and then taking the logical AND of 
the resulting policy-compliant resources at the end nodes.  
A typical sequence of operations is shown in Fig. 2. After a successful rendezvous in 
the scope, the client is returned information about end-to-end resources that it can use 
for the graphlet formation. If the transport in question is multicast data dissemination, 
then a separate resource allocation protocol could be coupled with the protocol as we 
did in [2]. The client side implementation of the transport would then take the resource 
description from rendezvous as an input and exchange packets with the selected fast-
path domains that would reserve the graphlet. The resource allocation layer could pro-
duce, for example, a set of forwarding identifiers (Fid), such as zFilter [21], that could 
be used as an opaque capability to access the graphlet securely without affecting the rest 
of the network. For this we use the zFormation technique described in [22].  
We note that, for example, onion routing could be used for the resource allocation, 
which would hide the destination of the communication from the transit domains and 
thus guarantee some level of network neutrality. Also pseudonyms for domains can be 
used to hide the location of the service from its users. We refer to our work in [2] for 
a more detailed example of graphlet formation in an intra-domain architecture where 
the dedicated nodes handling a transport can be scattered in the network. The TM of 
the domain just routes the transports through compatible nodes while balancing the 
load to each node. This means that the transport functionality does not even have to 
operate at backbone line speeds because of demultiplexing the flows to multiple 
nodes. Thus, we claim that the deployment of new transport functionality in the net-
work to be run at branching points of graphlets can be done scalably.  
5 Related Work 
This section covers related work for publish/subscribe systems and network layer 
security solutions. A data-oriented network architecture DONA [4] replaces a tradi-
tional DNS-based namespace with self-certifying flat labels, which are derived from 
cryptographic public keys. DONA names are expressed as a P:L pair, where P is a 
hash of a principal's public key which owns the data and L is a label. DONA utilizes 
an IP header extension mechanism to add a DONA header to the IP header, and sepa-
rate resolution handlers (RHs) are used to resolve P:L pairs in topological locations. 
In content-centric networking (CCN) [3] every packet has an unique human-
readable name. CCN uses two types of packets. Consumers of data send interest 
packets to the network, and a nodes possessing the data reply with the corresponding 
data packet. Since packets are independently named, a separate interest packet must 
be sent for each required data packet. In CCN data packets are signed by the original 
publisher allowing independent verification, however interest packet's are not always 
protected by signatures. 
Security issues of the content-based pub/sub system have been explored in [7]. The 
work proposes secure event types, where the publication's user friendly name is tied 
to the publisher's cryptographic key. 
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5.1 Security Mechanisms 
Most of existing network layer security proposals utilize hash chains or Merkle trees 
[8]. Examples of hash chain based solutions include TESLA [9], which is time-based 
hash chain scheme, and ALPHA [10] that relies on interaction between the sender and 
receiver. While hash chain approaches are very lightweight, they have several down-
sides, such as path dependency and complex signaling. Merkle tree based solutions 
have high bandwidth overhead for large trees, and their performance suffers if packets 
arrive in out-of-order. 
Accountable Internet Protocol (AIP) [11] aims to improve security by providing 
accountability on the network layer. AIP uses globally self-certifying unique end-
point identifiers (EID) to identify and address the source and the destination of the 
connection, in addition to normal IP addresses. EIDs contain hashes of host's public 
keys that are communicating within the network. AIP aims to prevent source address 
spoofing in the following way: If the router receives a packet from the unknown EID, 
the router will send a verification message back and the node will reply with a mes-
sage signed by its private key. Since EID is hash of node's public key, this proves that 
the node owns a corresponding private key and thus has a right to use the EID. 
Identity-based encryption and signature scheme (IBE) [12] allows a label, e.g., the 
user's e-mail address to be used as user's public key, simplifying the key distribution 
problem. However, IBE relies on a centralized entity called private key generator 
(PKG), which knows all private keys of its users.              
6 Conclusion and Future Work 
In this paper we introduced a data-centric inter-domain pub/sub architecture  addressing 
availability and data integrity. We used the concept of scope to separate the logical 
structure of linked data from the orthogonal distribution strategies used to determine 
how the data is communicated in the network. This is still ongoing work and, for exam-
ple, the ANDL language and quantitative analysis will be covered in our future work. 
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